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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses inflation targeting in emerging market economies (EMEs), and develops applied
prescriptions for the conduct of monetary policy and inflation-targeting design in EMEs. We verify
that EMEs have faced more acute trade-offs – higher output and inflation volatility – and worse
performance than developed economies. These results stem from more pronounced external shocks,
lower credibility, and lower level of development of institutions in these countries. In order to
improve their performance, we recommend high levels of transparency and communication with the
public and the development of more stable institutions. At an operational level, we propose a
procedure that a central bank under inflation targeting can apply and communicate when facing
strong supply shocks, and suggest a monitoring structure for an inflation-targeting regime under an
IMF program.
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The performance of inflation targeting regimes around the world has been 
positive. Average inflation in both emerging markets and developed economies is 
substantially lower after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime than immediately 
before its adoption (Figure 1).
1 However, emerging market economies (EMEs) have had 
a relatively worse performance. In these countries, deviations from both central targets 
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This suggests that either inflation targeters in EMEs are less committed to their 
targets or inflation targeting in these countries is a more challenging task than in 
developed ones. The latter explanation is related to the more volatile macroeconomic 
environment and to weaker institutions and credibility in these countries that lead to 
more acute trade-offs than the existing ones in developed economies.  
                                                 
1  Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), and Corbo, 
Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) have found evidence of additional gains stemming from 
inflation targeting. Ball and Sheridan (2003) have found no evidence that inflation targeting countries 
have had a better performance in the OECD. 
2 The deviations of inflation from central targets and from upper bounds of targets were 81% and 167% 
higher than in developed economies, respectively (table available upon request).
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EMEs under inflation targeting have the challenge of breaking the vicious circle 
between, on one side, low credibility and more fragile institutions, and, on the other 
side, higher macroeconomic instability and vulnerability to external shocks. It is a long 
process that involves acquiring credibility as a monetary policy institution committed to 
price stability in the context of higher instability.  
This paper assesses inflation targeting in EMEs, when compared to that in 
developed economies, and develops applied prescriptions for the conduct of monetary 
policy and inflation-targeting design. We verify that EMEs have faced more acute trade-
offs than developed countries: both output and inflation are more volatile, and the 
inflation level is higher. The explanation for the different performance of EMEs relies 
on the presence of more fragile institutions and imperfect credibility, and on the nature 
and magnitude of the shocks that hit these economies. 
There are several instances where these more acute trade-offs emerge. Take the 
case of a “sudden stop” in the inflow of capital to an EME leading to a substantial 
depreciation of the currency (e.g. Brazil in 2002 was faced with a negative swing of 
USD 30 billion – or 6% of GDP – in capital flows relative to an already difficult 2001 
that led to a nominal depreciation of 50%). Even in a context of good initial conditions 
– low pass-through and 12-month forward inflation expectations on track – this event 
led to a breach of the inflation target and, given some inertia, to a worsening of both 
inflation expectations and actual future inflation (Brazil's target of 4% was breached 
with an inflation of 12.5%, and 12-month forward inflation expectations were 11.0% at 
the end of December 2002). In this context, what is the optimal response to these types 
of shocks? Should one take 24 months or longer to converge to the target even when 
building credibility and reputation is still important?     4
  In general, in the more volatile environment in EMEs, some applied and 
theoretical issues deserve attention: i) how to build credibility when faced with larger 
shocks? How to balance flexibility and credibility in such instance? ii) how does an 
inflation targeting regime work in a disinflation process? And in a credibility building 
process? iii) how to deal with shocks that represent important changes in relative prices? 
iv) should bands be wider and the central points of inflation targets be higher in EMEs? 
v) how should IMF conditionality be designed with an inflation targeting country? 
The paper discusses these monetary policy issues. Its focus, therefore, is more 
applied. For that purpose, our analysis is based on empirical findings for EMEs and, in 
particular, on our own experience at the Central Bank of Brazil, besides the use of 
simulations of a model to guide our discussions. In a way, as the case of Brazil 
represents the first stress test of an inflation targeting regime, the lessons learned may 
someday be useful for other countries. 
We stress the role of communication and transparency as crucial for the process 
of building credibility. Once the main issues are laid out, as a by-product, the paper also 
includes two applied proposals. The first is a transparent procedure that a central bank 
under inflation targeting can apply and communicate when facing strong supply shocks. 
The second is a design of a monitoring structure for an inflation-targeting regime under 
an IMF program. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents some stylized 
facts about EMEs and developed countries. It contains a statistical comparison of the 
conduct and results of monetary policy in EMEs and developed countries. The third 
section presents a theoretical model of a small open economy, which is employed to 
simulate the effects of some shocks and changes in inflation targets. The fourth section 
discusses some explanations for why EMEs face higher volatility. It analyzes the   5
challenge of constructing credibility and reducing inflation levels, the effect of large 
external shocks, and addresses issues on fiscal and financial dominance. Section five 
addresses how to deal with shocks. 
 
2. Stylized facts about inflation targeting in emerging market economies 
  In this section we present basic stylized facts comparing the volatilities of 
inflation, output, exchange rates, and interest rates, and average of inflation and output 
growth in emerging markets and developed economies.
3  
We have faced two difficulties in defining the differences across the two country 
groups. First, there exist some differences across EMEs; therefore, not all characteristics 
that we list are common to all these economies. However, given that they are present in 
a significant part of the group, we call them "stylized facts". Second, in most EMEs, the 
adoption of inflation targeting is recent, making it difficult to draw conclusions and to 
apply econometric methods. Table 1 shows the dates of adoption for emerging and 
developed economies. The number of inflation targeters among developing and 
developed economies amounts to 12 and 8, respectively. Most of the developed 
countries adopted inflation targeting between 1990 and 1993, whereas the majority of 
the developing countries adopted it from 1998 on.  
                                                 
3 The assessment of some country experiences and of some issues involved in the design of the inflation 
targeting can be found in Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999), Truman (2002), Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), and 
Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2002).   6






Months After IT 
adoption
Developed Economies
Australia Apr-93 2% - 3% 1.22 1.74
Canada Feb-91 3% - 5% 6.83 1.68
Iceland Mar-01 2.5% (-1.5%+3.5%) 4.05 8.72
New Zealand Mar-90 3% - 5% 7.03 4.52
Norway Mar-01 2.5 3.64 1.10
Sweden Jan-93 2% (+- 1%) 1.76 1.70
Switzerland Jan-00 <= 2% 1.63 0.90
United Kingdom  Oct-92 1% - 4% 3.57 1.35
Average 2.8 3.72 2.71
Median 2.5 3.61 1.69
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil* Jun-99 8% (+- 2%) 3.15 6.51
Chile Jan-91 15% - 20% 27.31 19.47
Colombia Sep-99 15% 9.22 9.35
Czech Republic Jan-98 5.5% - 6.5% 9.98 3.5
Hungary Jun-01 7%(+-1%) 10.78 4.87
Israel Jan-92 14%-15% 18.03 10.74
Mexico Jan-99 <=13% 18.61 11.03
Peru  Jan-94 15% - 20% 39.49 13.71
Poland Oct-98 <=9.5 10.44 8.82
South Africa** Feb-00 3% - 6% 2.65 7.77
South Korea Jan-98 9%(+ -1%) 6.57 1.46
Thailand Apr-00 0%-3.5% 1.04 2.47
Average 10.3 13.11 8.31
Median 9.3 10.21 8.30
** First target established for 2002.
Initial Targets and Inflation Around Adoption of Inflation Targeting
Table 1
(12-Month Accumulated Inflation)




We consider two samples. The first refers to the period after the adoption of 
inflation targeting in each country. The objective is to compare countries with the same 
regime. However, since the periods across countries are different, the world 
macroeconomic environment is different as well. Then we consider a second sample 
that refers to a recent period, which includes Asian, Brazilian and Russian crises: 1997-
mid-2002, which we refer to as fixed sample. In this case, some countries are inflation   7
targeters in the whole sample, whereas others are just in part of it. Table 2 and Figure 2 













Australia 2.05 0.13 1.96 0.58 4.78 5.89
Canada 0.83 0.04 1.30 1.14 3.57 1.96
Iceland 2.45 0.15 3.13 3.02 4.17 4.05
New Zealand 1.21 0.16 3.61 1.47 3.09 1.65
Norway 0.77 0.10 2.25 1.46 2.66 2.44
Sweden 1.11 0.12 2.41 0.44 2.58 1.24
Switzerland 0.54 0.08 1.14 0.92 1.79 0.85
United Kingdom 0.92 0.06 0.79 1.13 2.61 2.46
Average 1.24 0.11 2.07 1.27 3.16 2.57
Median 1.02 0.11 2.11 1.13 2.88 2.20
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil 2.09 0.15*** 2.06 7.06 1.81 5.89
Chile 1.30 0.17 3.25 - 3.11 3.88
Colombia 5.43 0.25 3.38 10.02 0.81 12.51
Czech Republic 3.46 0.09 2.73 5.81 1.18 5.31
Hungary 4.09 0.16 - 1.13 - 11.21
Israel 3.18 0.10 3.36 3.34 2.98 4.35
Mexico 5.98 0.07 3.17 7.26 4.05 11.72
Peru  3.04 0.11 3.45 5.50 2.11 3.89
Poland 4.13 0.11 2.40 4.14 3.85 8.40
South Africa 2.13 0.26 1.11 3.65 2.26 6.51
South Korea 2.36 0.14 6.38 5.52 4.31 3.73
Thailand 3.25 0.14 6.13 6.72 0.08 2.88
Average 3.37 0.15 3.40 5.47 2.41 6.69
Median 3.22 0.14 3.25 5.52 2.26 5.60
Data source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (quarterly data).
* refers to the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/average).
** growth rate measured comparing the current quarter to the quarter of the previous year.
*** refers to the period 1999:1-2002:2. For 1997:1-2002:2, the value is 0.31.
Table 2
Countries
Average Volatility of Basic Variables
Volatility and Average of Selected Variables for 1997:1 - 2002:2
 
 
In both samples, the date indicate that, in comparison to developed economies, 
the volatilities of all variables–inflation, exchange rate,
5 output and interest rate–and the 
inflation level are higher in EMEs. The more challenging trade-off faced by EMEs is 
                                                 
4 The data referring to the first sample is available upon request. 
5 For the inflation targeting sample, the measured exchange rate volatility is similar.   8
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the combination of variability of output growth and 
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3.  Model 
We develop a small open economy model in order to illustrate the main points 
raised in the paper. The objective is to simulate the effects of some shocks and changes 
in inflation targets. The model combines features of Batini, Harrison, and Millard’s 
(2001), and McCallum and Nelson’s (2000) formulations. 
Imports enter as intermediate goods in contrast to large part of open economy 
literature, which usually uses a model with imports as consumption goods. As stressed 
by McCallum and Nelson (2000), a specification where imports enter as intermediate 
goods captures better the features of data. In comparison to models where imports enter 
as consumption goods, such as in Galí and Monacelli (2002), McCallum and Nelson's 
(2000) model generates a lower and more delayed correlation between exchange rate 
changes and inflation rate, closer to that observed in the data. Furthermore, intermediate 
goods are the major item in imports. Table 3 records the share in imports of goods 
classified by use for five countries. On average, consumption goods represent only 
21.3% of the total imports, whereas capital and intermediate goods shares are 29.5% 
and 46.2%, respectively.  Since there is no imported consumption goods in the model, 
there is no distinction between domestic and CPI inflation, differently from Svensson 





Australia 30.2% 21.3% 48.5% 100.0%
Brazil 12.8% 26.6% 60.6% 100.0%
Chile 19.8% 21.0% 59.3% 100.0%
Mexico 19.8% 57.7% 22.5% 100.0%
New Zealand* 24% 21% 40% 85%
Simple Average 21.3% 29.5% 46.2%
* 1999. Part of imports not classified by use.
Data source: Central banks and national institutes of statistics.
Imports Classified by Use - 2001
Table 3
   10
 
The model is derived from the optimization of infinitely-lived households and 
firms. We present directly the log approximation of the variables around the non-
stochastic  flexible-price  steady  state.  Lower  case  variables  represent  log-deviations 
from their steady-state values.
6 We present here only the most important equations of 
the model.
7 The economy is comprised of households, firms (owned by the households), 
and government. Firms produce differentiated consumption goods using a Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
, ) 1 ( t t t t m n a y α α − + + =         ( 1 )  
where yt is output, at represents a stochastic productivity factor, nt  is (domestic) labor, 
and mt is imported goods. 
Production is either consumed by domestic households or exported (therefore, 
the economy exports consumption goods and imports intermediate ones): 
, t x t c t x s c s y + =          ( 2 )  





  The aggregate demand equations are 
, ) (
1
1 1 ct t t t
c
t t t E i c E c ε π
γ
+ − − = + +        ( 3 )  
,
*
t t t y q x + =η            (4) 
                                                 
6  ), log( ) log( SS
t t t X X x − =  where Xt
SS  is the steady-state value for Xt, and log is the natural logarithm. Since 
, ) 1 log( t t r r ≈ +  the lower case variables represent percentage deviations from the steady state. 
7 The derivation of the model from the optimization of households and firms, and all the equations 
resulting from the log-linearization are available upon request.   11
where  it is the nominal interest rate, Et is the expectations operator, inflation is 
, 1 − − = t t t p p π   t p  is the price level,  c γ  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for consumption,  ct ε  is a shock to preferences, η  is the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods, qt is the real exchange rate defined as 
t t t t p p s q − + =
* ,  st is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price in domestic 
currency of a unit of foreign currency, 
*
t p  is the foreign price level, and 
*
t y  is output of 
the rest of the world. Star 
* indicates a variable of the rest of the world. All variables of 
the rest of the world are treated as exogenous in the model. 
The model has domestic and foreign bonds, both private. Domestic bonds are 
denominated in domestic currency and are held only by domestic residents. Foreign 
bonds are denominated in foreign currency, and their prices include a stochastic country 
risk premium. The derived uncovered interest rate parity condition is presented below: 
, 1
*
t t t t t t s s E i i ζ + − = − +         ( 5 )  
where 
*
t i  is the rest of the world interest rate, and  t ζ is the country risk premium. 
  Firms maximize the difference between expected marginal revenue and unit 
cost. There is price rigidity: only a fraction of firms is allowed to adjust prices each 
period. The choice of the optimum price for the firm yields  , 1 t t t t v E λ π β π + = +  
whereβ  is a discount factor, and t v  is the real unit cost given by:
8 
, ) 1 ( t t Mt t t p a p w v − − − + = α α        ( 6 )    
                                                 
8  ,





=  where θ  is the probability of the firm not adjust its price in period t.   12
where  t w  is wage, and  Mt p  is the price of imports in domestic currency defined as 
*
Mt t Mt p s p + = , where 
*
Mt p  is the price of imports in foreign currency. Note that inflation 
is affected by exchange rate via price of intermediate goods.  
Nevertheless, this formulation of the Phillips curve delivers some counterfactual 
results, as stressed in Galí and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer (1997). It implies that current 
changes in inflation are negatively related to the lagged output gap, that is, a positive 
output gap would lead to a reduction in the inflation rate in the following period. In 
contrast, the empirical evidence is that a positive output gap is followed by an increase 
in the inflation rate over the cycle. Moreover, this formulation implies that, with 
perfectly credible announcements, a disinflation is costless.  
These empirical results have motivated some authors to work with a hybrid 
Phillips curve: besides the expected inflation term, the equation also contains a lagged 
term for inflation. In the paper, we do not have special concern about the specific 
derivation for the persistence in inflation.
9 As in Galí and Gertler (1999), one possibility 
is to consider that there is a fraction of backward-looking firms.
10 
In addition, we can also postulate a "cost-push" shock. This term could reflect 
changes in the mark-up resulting from movements in price-elasticity of demand over the 
cycle or in tax rates. It could also be used as a proxy for the case of change in relative 
prices across sectors.
11 The resulting aggregate supply equation is: 
 
                                                 
9 Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have generated inflation persistence assuming that agents care about relative 
wages over the life of the wage contract. Roberts (1997, 1998) has found some empirical evidence that 
expectations are less than perfectly rational: a fraction of the agents would have adaptive expectations or 
there would be a partial adjustment of expectations (these would adjust only gradually to the fully rational 
value). Galí and Gertler (1999) have found that the fraction of backward-looking firms is statistically 
significant, although not quantitatively important. 
10 For simplification, we are assuming that λ is not affected by the presence of the backward-looking 
term. 
11 For example, in the Brazilian case, there has been an important change in relative prices in the last 
years, only partially related to exchange rate and international prices movements.   13
t t b t t t f t E µ π γ λν π γ π + + + = − + 1 1 ,        ( 7 )    
where 1 = + f b γ γ . 
  We assume that the shocks follow stationary univariate autoregressive processes 
of order one. 
  The interest rate is the policy instrument. Monetary policy is given by a Taylor-
type simple rule or by optimal simple rules. In the latter the optimal coefficients are 
obtained by the minimization of the standard central bank's intertemporal loss function 
that penalizes deviations of output gap ( t y
~



























i t i t i t y
i
t y w E π π β ,       ( 8 )  
where  y w  is related negatively to the aversion to inflation variability,
12 
T
t π  is the 
inflation target, and  t t t y y y − =
~
, where  t y  is potential output, which is defined as the 
output that would prevail in the case of fully price flexibility. The interest rate is 
restricted to react to selected variables. We use the algorithm in Dennis (2002) to 
estimate the optimal simple rule.
13 
                                                 
12 In the simulations, we have considered different values for  y w . We are not concerned about the 
derivation of this parameter based on microfoundations. This objective function can be derived from a 
household utility function in the presence of price rigidity (Rotemberg, and Woodford, 1998; Woodford, 
2002). Woodford (2002) has also derived the objective function in the case where prices are indexed to a 
lagged price index between the occasions on which they are re-optimized. The objective function includes 
a quasi-differenced inflation rate term rather than the inflation rate itself. We have used the usual 
objective function based on the following grounds: i) the objective function is used only to have an idea 
of the optimal coefficients in the central bank's reaction function; ii) in practice, this objective function 
seems to be more used by central banks. 
13 The explanation of the calibration of the model is available upon request. 
   14
4. Explaining the higher volatility: building credibility, reducing the inflation 
levels, and dealing with fiscal, financial and external dominance 
The conduct of monetary policy in EMEs faces at least three major challenges: i) 
to build credibility, ii) to reduce the level of inflation, and iii) to deal with fiscal, 
financial and external dominance. The presence of low credibility, inflation levels 
superior to the long-term goal, and large shocks result in higher volatility of output, 
inflation, and interest rate. Fiscal and financial dominance issues also have implications 
for these variables. In this section, we show how all these elements can help explain the 
stylized facts presented previously. 
The explanation for the different performance of EMEs relies on the presence of 
more fragile institutions and imperfect credibility, on the necessity of reduction of 
inflation levels, and on the nature and magnitude of the shocks that hit these economies. 
 
4.1. Building credibility and reducing inflation rate levels 
  Institutions in emerging economies tend to be weaker than in developed 
economies. Central banks are no exception. In this context, the adoption of inflation 
targeting represents an effort to enhance the credibility of the monetary authority as 
committed to price stability. 
Nevertheless, building credibility takes time. During this transition period, 
central bank's actions not only have to be consistent with the inflation targeting 
framework, but also have to take into account that private agents do not fully trust that 
central bank will act accordingly. Private agents have concerns about the commitment 
of the central bank to the target itself, and to its reaction to shocks. In the first case, 
given the history of low credibility, private agents assign some positive probability that 
the central bank will renege on its commitment to the targets. As a result, the expected   15
inflation and consequently the actual inflation tend to be higher than with a perfectly 
credible monetary authority. Similarly, when the economy is hit by an inflationary 
shock, private agents do not trust completely that the central bank will react strongly. As 
a consequence, the central bank incurs a cost of trust building as it has to react to curb 
the inflationary pressures stemming from low credibility and has to "prove" that is 
committed to the new regime. During some period, the volatility of interest rate and 
output will be higher, and, since the central bank also takes into account output costs, 
the inflation volatility also tends to be higher when compared to a situation of full 
credibility. 
Imperfect credibility concerning the fulfillment of the targets becomes more 
important as we consider that the role of inflation targeting in emerging economies is 
not only to assure that inflation will be around its long-term level, but also make it 
converge to low levels. In fact, emerging market countries have had to face much higher 
initial inflation rates than developed countries. Table 1 shows the inflation around the 
moment of adoption of inflation targeting (right before and after), and the initial targets. 
When inflation targeting was adopted, the average inflation in the developed countries 
was 3.7%, whereas in the EMEs was 13.1%.
14 The values are also shown in Figure 4. 
Half of the developing economies had a two-digit inflation rate when implementing 
inflation targeting. In the case of Peru, Chile, Israel and Mexico, the inflation rate was 
39.5%, 27.3%, 18.0% and 18.6%, respectively.  
The differences are even clearer when we consider the first targets that were 
established (Figure 5). In developed economies, the maximum upper bound for the 
target was 6%, with an average of 2.8% for the central target, whereas for developing 
economies the highest upper bound reached 20%, and the average was 10.3%. 
                                                 
14 The low inflation rate in Brazil that prevailed prior to the adoption of inflation targeting was in part a 
result of an overvalued exchange rate.   16
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Since inflation was higher than the long-term goal, the targets are decreasing in 
time. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the central target average for both country groups. 
They are relatively stable for developed economies, and decreasing for EMEs.   17
Figure 6
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If inflation targeting is adopted in an economy with an inflation rate significantly 
higher than the long-term goal, the central bank has to conduct an active policy with 
output costs to bring inflation down. The reduction in inflation faces two obstacles, 
which result in costly disinflation and higher volatility of inflation and output: (i) the 
already mentioned imperfect credibility, and (ii) the presence of some degree of 
inflation persistence, resulting from some backward-looking behavior in price setting. 
The presence of backward-looking behavior may be due to factors such as indexed 
wage contracts, and adaptive expectations. In particular, in Brazil, the adjustment of 
regulated prices such as electricity and telephone service follows a contractual rule that 
implies a high degree of persistence. 
Decreasing targets are a source of possible non-fulfillment of targets because it 
is difficult to assess the current backward-looking behavior and the speed of future 
convergence of inflation expectations. The higher deviations from the targets in EMEs 
may then be related to the variability of shocks as well as to the fact that inflation   18
targeting was typically adopted when inflation was significantly higher than the long-
term goal. 
To have some indication of the speed of inflation convergence and of the output 
costs involved, we have simulated the case of a reduction in the inflation targets with 
imperfect credibility. To focus on this issue, we have used the closed economy version 
of the model previously presented ( 1 , 1 = = c s α ). The result is a standard model. The 
aggregate supply curve without the backward-looking term can be written as 
~
*
1 t t t t y E λ π β π + = + , where  ) (
*
n c γ γ λ λ + ≡ . The central bank announces a reduction in 
the inflation rate target from  To π  to  Tn π as of the current quarter, but private agents do 
not fully believe that this change is permanent. They assign a probability  t b  that at the 
following quarter the central bank reneges on its announcement and returns to  To π . 





t t b b E π π π − + = + 1 1 . We have 
considered the case of an optimal monetary policy under discretion.
15 The central bank 
is allowed to reoptimize every period. We have assumed that if the central bank 
maintains the new target, the probability of reneging on its announcement declines over 
time. We have used a simple law of motion:  t b t b b ρ = +1 , where  1 0 < ≤ b ρ .
16  
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of output gap and inflation to a reduction 
of 3 p.p. in the inflation target for the cases of imperfect and perfect credibility. If we 
compare the first announced targets to the inflation in the previous twelve months 
(Table 1), we verify that many countries had initial targets more than 3 p.p. lower than 
the previous inflation. We have assumed that the initial probability of reneging is 0.8, 
and 8 . 0 = b ρ . Since we are considering quarterly data, the latter implies that, at the end 
                                                 
15 We have not shown the results under commitment because it is less reasonable to assume that private 
agents believe the central bank is committed and, at the same time, will not keep its announcement. 
16 The derivation is available upon request.   19
of the year,  41 . 0 = t b . The inflation rate refers to the four-quarter accumulated inflation 
above the new target. We assume that the inflation was stable at the old target before the 
announcement. At the end of the first year, in the case of imperfect credibility, the 
inflation rate is still 1.42 p.p. above the new target, and the output gap presented a 
reduction of 0.49% on average.
17 Therefore, even assuming a relatively rapid reduction 
in the degree of imperfect credibility, the inflation rate converges only gradually to the 
new target. In the case of perfect credibility, inflation expectations converge 
automatically to the new target. As a result, inflation also converges quickly to the new 
target. It is not necessary any output gap reduction. 
 
Figure  7 










Imperfect credibility: impulse responses to a 3 p.p. inflation target reduction
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17 In this simulation, we are assuming that the relative output weight in the objective function is equal to 
0.3. If we increase it to 1.0, the effect is significant on the output response but low on the inflation path: 
the inflation rate is 1.45, and the output gap has a reduction of 0.15% on average.   20
Similar reasoning is applied when the economy is hit by an inflationary shock. 
The possibility that the central bank will not be tough for enough time increases 
inflation expectations, requiring a higher output reduction. The result is a higher 
volatility of inflation, output, and interest rate. 
As stressed by Svensson (2002), the economy incurs higher output variability at 
the beginning of the regime to gain credibility, but later on it benefits from an improved 
trade-off with lower output and inflation variability, and the central bank can then be a 
more flexible inflation targeter. 
In the Brazilian case, the construction of credibility has been a process that 
combines reactions to inflationary pressures and increased transparency to the public. 
The Central Bank has reacted to inflation expectations in a way that is consistent with 
the inflation targeting framework. Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003)
18 
have estimated a reaction function for the Central Bank of Brasil for the first three and 
half years of inflation targeting. It relates the interest rate to deviations of the 12-month 
ahead expected inflation from the target, allowing also for some interest-rate smoothing 
and reaction to the output gap.
19 Table 4 shows the estimations using inflation forecast 
of the central bank and of private agents (from survey). The point estimates of the 
coefficient on inflation expectations are greater than one and significantly different from 
zero in all specifications. Moreover, in most of specifications, the coefficient is 
statistically greater than one.
20 Therefore, we can conclude that the Central Bank 
                                                 
18 That paper is an updated and shorter version of Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2002). 
19 They have estimated the equation  ) ) ( )( 1 ( 1 3
*
2 0 1 1 1 − + + − + − + − + = t j t j t t t t y E i i α π π α α α α , where it is the 
Selic rate decided by the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom), Etπ t+j is inflation expectations and π
*
t+j is 
the inflation target, both referring to 12 months ahead, and yt is the output gap. 
20 The point estimates, however, vary across specifications. Using private agents' expectations (sample 
2000:1-2002:12), the point estimates are around 2.1-2.3, whereas with central bank expectations (sample 
1999:6-2002:12) they are 3.5 and 5.7. The p-values for the test that the coefficient is equal to 1 are 0.150, 
0.101, 0.012 and 0.040 in specifications I, II, III and IV.   21
conducts monetary policy on a forward-looking basis, and responds to inflationary 
pressures. 
 
I II III IV
Constant 1.65 3.06* 4.58*** 5.38**
(1.08) (1.59) (1.52) (2.07)
Interest Rate (t-1) 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.71*** 0.67***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
Inflation Expectations (deviations from the target) 5.70* 3.54** 2.32*** 2.09***
(3.20) (1.51) (0.53) (0.53)
Output Gap (t-1) -0.36* -0.10
(0.21) (0.15)
R-squared 0.9129 0.9160 0.9205 0.9214
Adjusted R-squared 0.9084 0.9094 0.9157 0.9140
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.7853 0.7210 0.6586 0.6411
4 lags 0.6831 0.5298 0.5362 0.3991
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 4
Estimation of Reaction Function of the Central Bank of Brazil
Dependent Variable: Target for the Nominal Selic Interest Rate (monthly data)
(1999:7-2002:12) (2000:1-2002:12) Regressors
Using Central Bank Inflation 
Expectations       




We also simulate the case of reduction in the inflation targets in the presence of 
a backward-looking component in the aggregate supply curve equal to 0.4 (therefore, 
6 . 0 = f γ ). We use the open economy version of the model. The central bank reacts 
according to a simple expectational rule:  1 5 . 1 + = t t t E i π . The optimal coefficients found 
using two different weights on the output gap in the objective function,  3 . 0 = y w  and   22
0 . 1 = y w , are 1.79 and 1.34, respectively.
21 As in the case of imperfect credibility, 
inflation decreases slowly to the new target, and the optimal output gap is negative. 
With a 3 p.p. reduction in the inflation target, inflation is 0.78 p.p. above the target at 
the fourth quarter, and the output gap reduction is 0.55% on average in the first year. In 
the case of a purely forward-looking aggregate supply curve, inflation converges 
automatically to the new target. 
As the inflation targeting regime is supposed to affect inflation expectations, we 
can consider the possibility that the backward-looking component in the price 
adjustment becomes less important as credibility increases. The share of backward-
looking firms could become smaller and/or firms could consider less the past inflation 
to adjust prices. This would reduce the degree of persistence in inflation. Minella, 
Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003) have estimated a simple aggregate supply curve 
for the low inflation period in Brazil to assess if the inflation-targeting regime was 
accompanied by some structural change.
22 They regress inflation rate on its own lags, 
the unemployment rate (lagged one period), and the exchange rate change in 12 months 
(lagged one period).  
Table 5 records the results when including only one lag for inflation and when 
including two. The regression also includes dummy variables that multiply the constant 
and lagged inflation for the inflation-targeting period,
23 and a dummy that assumes the 
value of 1 for the last three months of 2002. Without adding this last dummy, the 
residuals in both specifications present serial correlation. Actually, the end of 2002 is a 
very peculiar period, which it is difficult to be fitted by a simple Phillips curve.  The 
                                                 
21 Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) have found a value between 0.32 and 0.41 for inflation targeting 
countries. Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2001) have used 1.0 (including also a term for interest rate in the 
objective function). 
22 The procedure is similar to that in Kuttner and Posen (1999). 
23 Dummies for the inflation targeting period that multiply unemployment and the exchange rate do not 
enter significantly; therefore, they were excluded from the estimation.   23
authors find that the backward-looking term has decreased. The point estimate of the 
autoregressive coefficient decreases from 0.56 to 0.10 in the inflation targeting period 













Dummy inflation rate (t-1)
1 -0.46*** -0.43**
(0.17) (0.19)
Dummy inflation rate (t-2)
1 -0.35*
(0.20)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.08 -0.09*
(0.05) (0.05)






Adjusted R-squared 0.5271 0.5624
LM Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.6646 0.7022
4 lags 0.2218 0.3599
2 Dummy has value one in 2002:10 - 2002:12, and zero otherwise.
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. Since exchange rate change refers to the 12-month change, the sample starts in1995:07
to avoid the inclusion of data of the period before the stabilization.
1Dummy has value one in the inflation-targeting period (1999:06-2002:12), and zero otherwise. It multiplies
the associated variable.
Table 5
Estimation of Aggregate Supply Curve
Dependent Variable: Monthly Inflation Rate - 1995:08 - 2002:12
 
                                                 
24 This result is in line with the findings in Kuttner and Posen (2001). Using a broad dataset of 191   24
4.2. Dominance issues: fiscal, financial, and external 
  We deal here with three elements that seem to be potential features of EMEs: 
weak fiscal regimes, the risks associated with poorly regulated financial systems, and 
large external shocks. Each of these problems can be seen to lead to a form of 
dominance: fiscal, financial or external. In the case of fiscal and financial dominance, 
the problems that arise on the monetary policy front are quite similar: the fear that one 
or both regimes will break down increases the probability that the government will 
inflate in the future, and, therefore, increases expected inflation. This in turn adds a 
great deal to the challenge of establishing a solid monetary anchor. The external 
dominance refers to the vulnerability to external shocks, which results in higher 
macroeconomic volatility. 
 
4.2.1. Fiscal dominance 
  The success of inflation targeting or of any monetary regime requires the 
absence of fiscal dominance. Therefore, implementation of inflation targeting needs to 
be accompanied by a strong fiscal regime. But even with that, in the case of past 
weaknesses, it takes time for government to gain the full confidence of private agents. 
This fear of fiscal dominance affects inflation expectations, requiring a tighter monetary 
policy, which in turn negatively affects the fiscal balance. 
The challenge, therefore, is to build fiscal and monetary regimes that reinforce 
one another. The evidence we have thus far on this issue is promising, but it may be too 
early to celebrate. Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) show that the fiscal imbalance 
at the time inflation targeting was adopted was lower in developing countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
monetary frameworks from 41 countries, they have found that inflation targeting reduces inflation 
persistence.   25
4.2.2. Financial dominance 
A problem for the conduct of monetary policy can arise when there is fear that a 
tightening may lead to a financial crisis. This may come as consequence of a weak 
and/or over-leveraged financial system, and may bring about the expectation that 
monetary policy will not be conducted with the goal of defending the nominal anchor of 
the economy. This problem can be characterized as a form of dominance, which we can 
name "financial dominance". For example, Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) have found that, 
in the aftermath of currency crises, an economy that faces a banking crises: i) has a 
lower probability of choosing a tight policy, and ii) when tight monetary policy is 
adopted, the probability of a successful recovery is lower.
25 
Banking sector weaknesses, and financial vulnerabilities in general, played a key 
role in the Asian crisis of 1997. This type of fragility may also be an issue when the 
financial system exhibits a significant presence of government-owned banks, either 
because these banks may themselves be weak, or because the government may use its 
banks in an unwise manner. 
Just as in the case of fiscal dominance it is necessary to work towards a strong 
fiscal regime, in the case of financial dominance care must be taken to make sure the 
regulation and supervision of the financial system is sound and permanent.  
Another issue is the predominance of short-term financial contracts and lower 
financial depth in EMEs, which tend to weaken the monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms.
26 According to Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000), the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP was on average 51.0% in EMEs, and 72.0% in developed countries in 
1997. The ratio of private credit to GDP was 63.9% and 81.0%, respectively. Moreover, 
                                                 
25 They have used a data set of currency crises in 80 countries for the period 1980-1998. 
26 Actually, there are two opposite effects in the case of short-term contracts: the wealth effect of change 
in interest rates is lower, but changes in the interest rates affect the cost of outstanding debt more quickly.   26
as Taylor (2000) stresses, without longer-term markets, short-term interest rates will 
have to move more quickly. Therefore, we tend to observe higher interest rate volatility. 
 
4.2.3. External dominance:  “sudden stops”  
Another possible explanation for the volatility shown in section 2 is the 
existence of larger shocks in EMEs. External shocks tend to play a more important role 
in EMEs than in developed countries. EMEs are subject to "sudden stops" in capital 
inflows. These shocks significantly affect the exchange rate, and consequently the 
inflation rate, leading to higher interest rates to curb the inflationary pressures. As a 
result, these economies tend to present a higher volatility of interest rates and exchange 
rates. 
Of course, sudden stops themselves may reflect weaker fundamentals, which 
map into lower credit ratings, among other problems. On the other hand, the presence of 
large and frequent external shocks generates greater instability in the economy, and may 
jeopardize the fulfillment of the targets, which may in turn negatively affect the 
credibility of the regime. This may be seen as a form of “external dominance”. It must 
be addressed through the strengthening of the fundamentals of the economy such as, in 
the case of inflation targeting, a fairly-clean exchange rate float (by that we mean the 
absence of an exchange-rate target) and, in general, a sufficient degree of openness and 
flexibility.  
The data presented in Table 2 confirm the higher volatility of the interest rate in 
EMEs. For the exchange rate, the data is less clear, but points to a higher volatility. The 
coefficient of variation (the ratio of standard deviation to the average) is 0.15 in EMEs 
and 0.11 in developed economies. However, there are some differences within the group 
of developing economies. Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Peru, and South Africa presented   27
significantly greater exchange rate volatility. The average of the coefficient of variation 
of the five countries is 0.22.  
  In order to try to measure the importance of external shocks, we have run VAR 
estimations for selected countries. We have used monthly and quarterly data of four 
variables: industrial production (or GDP), consumer price index, interest rate, and 
exchange rate. We have used a Cholesky decomposition with the order mentioned. We 
have considered two specifications: i) all variables in log level, and ii) price and 
exchange rate in first log-difference. We have estimated for three periods: a large period 
(which varies across countries, but that in general starts in the 1980s), the period before 
the adoption of inflation targeting, and the inflation-targeting period (all of them end in 
mid-2002). Table 6 records the values for the variance error decomposition of interest 
rate and price level (or inflation rate), considering a 12-month or 4-quarter horizon, for 
the inflation-targeting period. In particular, we show the percentage of the forecast error 
of interest rate and prices (or inflation) that is explained by shocks to exchange rate. In 
the Brazilian and South African cases, shocks to exchange rate explain a significant part 
of the forecast error of interest rate and prices. In Brazil, they explain 49% of the 
interest rate forecast errors, and 18% of the price forecast error (this figure is not 
statistically significant though). South Korea has similar results using monthly data, 
mainly for interest rate. On the other hand, for the developed economies and for 
Mexico, the estimations indicate that the exchange rate does not play an important role.   28
Shocks to exchange 
rate explaining forecast 
error for interest rate
Shocks to exchange 
rate explaining forecast 
error for inflation
Shocks to exchange 
rate explaining 
forecast error for 
interest rate
Shocks to exchange rate 




Canada 1 0 1 1
Sweden 2 8 4 6
UK 0 17 10 5
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil 49* 18 8 29*
Mexico 2 1 0 0
South Africa 36* 25* 36* 25
South Korea 26* 7 32 9
Quarterly Data***
Developed Economies
Australia 12 3 1 11
Canada 0 1 2 2
New Zealand 11 3 4 3
Sweden 4 1 4 10
UK 0 0 1 1
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil 57* 35 10 20
Mexico 1 0 1 12
South Korea 3 3 5 8
*** The sample for South Africa is too short.
** New Zealand and Australia do not have cpi and industrial production on a monthly basis.
VAR with Four Variables: Industrial Production (or GDP), CPI, Interest Rate, and Exchange Rate
Table 6
Estimation in levels for price and exchange rate
Estimation in first difference for price and 
exchange rate
Variance Error Decomposition After Adoption of Inflation Targeting (12-month or 4-quarter horizon) - %
* indicates that the value is significant at the 5% level.
 
 
Exchange-rate fluctuations do not always reflect the pressure of the external 
shocks because of policy responses, which include interest-rate changes and direct 
intervention in the exchange-rate market. Some emerging markets opt not to allow the 
exchange rate to reflect the extent of the external shocks. Some of the arguments are 
related to “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
27 In addition to inflationary 
pressures, significant exchange rate fluctuations have other implications for the 
economy, such as uncertainty concerning prices and the value of dollar-denominated 
liabilities and assets. Huge depreciations of the domestic currency may affect the 
                                                 
27 Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have developed a system of reclassifying historical exchange rate regimes. 
They have found that regimes that were officially classified as floating in reality use a form of de facto 
peg.   29
financial solvency of firms and financial institutions. In this case, the central bank may 
have additional goals in its objective function. According to Amato and Gerlach (2002), 
there are several reasons that may make appropriate for EMEs to give importance to the 
exchange rate beyond that related to its inflationary effects: i) with less developed 
foreign exchange markets, large shocks or capital flows cause significant volatility in 
the exchange rate if neglected by policies; ii) in economies with a poor history of 
monetary stability, the exchange rate tends to be a focal point for inflationary 
expectations; iii) exchange-rate fluctuations may have large impact on the relative 
profitability of firms across sectors; and iv) foreign currency borrowing may be 
significant. 
Therefore, it is worth examining the spread over Treasuries of the foreign-
currency denominated debt of the country, as another indicator of external shocks. Table 
7 shows the average and volatility of the spread of the Emerging Market Bond Index 
Plus (EMBI+) over the U.S. treasury for Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Poland and 
South Korea. Except for Poland, the standard deviation is always higher than 118 basis 
points. In the Brazilian case, it reaches 377 basis points in the inflation targeting period. 
As a result of these external pressures, we tend to observe a higher volatility of 
output, interest rates, and the exchange rate, and the possibility of non-fulfillment of 
targets tends to be higher. In the Brazilian case, the significant depreciation of the 
domestic currency was the main factor behind the non-fulfillment of the inflation targets 
in 2001 and 2002. The nominal exchange rate in Brazil accumulated an increase of 
84.7% during 2001 and 2002 (a depreciation of the domestic currency of 45.9%), 
representing a real depreciation of 44.6%. 
 













Brazil 879.35 389.07 0.44 987.14 377.82 0.38
Colombia 651.18 118.48 0.18 648.04 123.83 0.19
Mexico 443.40 150.03 0.34 408.37 130.19 0.32
Peru 601.75 120.64 0.20 601.75 120.64 0.20
Poland 233.03 38.17 0.16 232.65 35.88 0.15
South Korea 236.37 145.39 0.62 236.37 145.39 0.62
EMBI+ (based on monthly average)
Table 7
Country
** South Korea: 1998:05 - 2002:12.
* Colombia: 1999:05 - 2002:12. Peru: 1998:01 - 2002:12. Poland: 1998:01 - 2002:12. South Korea: 1998:05 - 2002:12. For 
Brazil and Mexico, the data for 1997 refers to EMBI.
1997:01 - 2002:12* After IT adoption until 2002:12**
 
 
We use the model to simulate the effects of a shock to the real exchange rate of 
45%, but instead of using the UIP condition, we use an autoregressive process for the 
real exchange rate (with an autoregressive coefficient equal to 0.5). As before, the 
central bank reacts according to a simple expectational rule:  1 5 . 1 + = t t t E i π , and the 
coefficient on lagged inflation is 0.4.  
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses. At the end of the fourth quarter, the four-
quarter accumulated inflation reaches 5.16%, and the output gap reduction is on average 
6.80% in the first year. Therefore, even with a significant output gap reduction, any 
existent inflation target would be breached. If we consider the inflation target for Brasil 
in 2002 of 4%, then, with this simulation, the inflation rate would reach 9.7%, distant 
even from the upper bound of 6.5%. 
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Figure 8 
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The existence of this possibility of breaching the targets due to large shocks 
leads us to analyze very important issues in the design of inflation targeting in emerging 
markets. The next section explores how to deal with higher volatility in an inflation 
targeting regime. 
 
5.  How to deal with higher volatility?  
The central element of the inflation-targeting regime is the public announcement 
of a numerical target for inflation. However, as Mishkin (2000) stresses, inflation 
targeting comprises much more than that. It also involves: i) an institutional 
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other 
goals are subordinated; ii) use of many variables for the instrument policy decision; iii)   32
increased transparency of monetary policy strategy; and iv) an increased accountability 
of the central bank.   
The issues presented in the last section imply important challenges for monetary 
policy. The key aspect is how to build credibility in the conduct of monetary policy and 
in the inflation targeting regime itself, and at the same time to be flexible enough to 
avoid unnecessary output costs that could lead to a perception that the regime is too 
costly. Communication and transparency become crucial. 
One of the most appealing features of inflation targeting is the flexibility it 
allows monetary policy when confronted with shocks. For instance, in dealing with a 
supply shock, the professional consensus among academic economists and central 
bankers is that a central bank should accommodate the direct price-level impact of the 
shock while calibrating monetary policy so as to avoid further rounds of price increases. 
In practice, however, this may come at a cost. The central bank’s commitment to low 
inflation may be questioned if the nature of the shock and the appropriateness of the 
policy response are not clear to most observers. The solution to this conundrum is to 
provide enough information to the public so as to make clear that the policy response is 
the right answer to a problem that is well understood. 
In general, the optimal response will depend on the nature of the shock, on a 
number of economic parameters and elasticities, and on the preferences of society 
relative to the inflation versus output-gap volatility trade-off. At a very basic level, it is 
therefore crucial that the central bank make an effort to identify the size and nature of 
shocks, focusing in particular on whether one is dealing with supply or demand shocks, 
temporary or permanent shocks, and their size and inflationary impact. Once the shocks 
are identified, the central bank can chose a monetary policy response that will deliver 
the chosen feasible pair of inflation and output gap paths.   33
Inflation-targeting central banks have developed a number of tools to deal with 
these issues. They involve the inflation targeting design, transparency, "adjusted" 
targets, and change in the IMF conditionality. 
 
5.1. Target bands, horizons and persistence of shocks  
The possibility that large shocks may cause target breaches leads to an important 
feature in the design of the inflation targeting regime: the size of the band around the 
central point of the target. Tighter bands tend to signal a preference for lower inflation 
volatility relative to lower output volatility. The band is typically seen as a barrier not to 
be broken. 
However, in a world of perfect information, where all shocks are precisely 
identified, there is no role for bands around the inflation target. Deviations from the 
point target would occur as an optimal response to shocks, given the parameters of the 
economy and the inflation aversion of society. An optimal response to a very large 
shock may demand large deviations from the central point of the target, sometimes 
beyond the upper bound of the target. The same holds for the horizon over which 
inflation is allowed to deviate from the target when the economy is hit by shocks. This 
horizon should also be determined according to the type, size and persistence of the 
shock as well as the parameters mentioned above. 
So why do countries opt to include target bands? While some countries may 
actually treat the band limit as a strict barrier not to be broken, in our view the bands 
should be treated mainly as a communications device. The bands should be considered 
mainly as checkpoints, with the central bank explaining clearly the reasons for the non-
fulfillment of the targets. This discussion, however, is not easily mapped into 
operational guidelines that can be implemented by the central bank. As a result, it is   34
necessary that the assumptions underlying the decision-making process of the central 
bank be clearly communicated. This means being explicit about a fairly precise path of 
inflation on the way back to the targeted level, so as not to loose the confidence of 
economic agents. Transparency therefore plays the key role of imposing enough 
discipline on the central bank in order to avoid the temptations depicted in the time-
consistency literature.
28 
In practice, the size of the bands varies across countries: 1 percentage point in 
Australia and Israel, 3 percentage points in South Africa, 3.5 in Iceland, and 4 in Brazil 
for 2002, and 5 for 2003 and 2004. What should be the size of the bands? One 
possibility would be for the size of the bands to be large enough to allow that in most of 
the circumstances the inflation rate is within them if monetary policy is conducted 
efficiently. Given some variability of shocks in the economy, inflation should be inside 
the bands in most of the cases, say 90% of the cases. Using the model, and assuming 
some variance for the shocks, we obtain the standard deviation of inflation (given some 
optimal rule). If we assume that the random shocks are normally distributed, we would 
find a band size corresponding to 1.65 standard deviations of inflation. 
The recurrent presence of larger shocks may also recommend higher central 
targets. As shown in Figure 6, the difference between the targets of EMEs and 
developed countries has decreased, but it is still positive. In 2002, the central point 
target for EMEs was 3.7%, whereas for developed countries was 2.2%. The higher 
target reflects not only higher past inflation but also the greater vulnerability to external 
shocks. One possible reason is the asymmetric effects of supply shocks. Given greater 
downward price rigidity, deflationary shocks tend to have a lower effect in inflation 
                                                 
28 It seems these days that the important lesson of the time consistency literature has reached most central 
banks. In fact, one finds a substantial number of central bankers around the world who seem to act as 
inflation-averse Rogoff (1985) central bankers.   35
than inflationary shocks. As a consequence, with higher shocks, this bias tends to be 
higher.  
The issue of the magnitude of the response to shocks leads us also to the 
discussion of the horizon to be used in the inflation targeting framework. As 
emphasized by Svensson (2002), in practice, the "flexible inflation targeting", where 
some weight is given to output stabilization, means aiming to achieve the inflation 
target at a somewhat longer horizon. Since EMEs are more subject to larger shocks, we 
would consider that their target horizon should naturally be longer. A danger here, of 
course, is that if the central bank is still building credibility, longer horizons could be 
interpreted as lenience, affecting its reputation.  
In practice, there is no magic number for the horizon that central banks should 
use to guide its reaction to supply shocks. It should be long enough to allow the 
workings of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms and some degree of 
smoothing of the effects of the shock. On the other hand, it should be short enough to 
neutralize part of its inflationary effect and allow convergence of inflation expectations 
to the target. At any rate, it is crucial that the central bank’s response be clearly 
explained so as to avoid reputational risk. Section 5.3 presents the procedure adopted by 
the Central Bank of Brazil in dealing with a series of large shocks during the years 2001 
and 2002. 
 
5.2. Monetary policy committees, meeting minutes, and inflation report 
To stress the importance of the existence of a monetary policy committee (MPC) 
may sound unnecessary to most observers in the more advanced economies, but it is no 
trivial matter in the EMEs. Until one such committee was created in Brazil, for 
example, monetary policy decisions were taken on an ad-hoc basis, typically at the end   36
of a Board meeting, at the end of the day, when everyone was already quite exhausted, 
and often without the benefit of proper preparation and analysis. An MPC which meets 
regularly on a monthly basis has created a proper environment for what, after all, is the 
key role of a central bank: to run monetary policy. The MPC meetings have become a 
ritual that provides those responsible for setting policy with a good decision-making 
environment. It moves Board members away from their otherwise hectic day-to-day 
schedules of meetings and phone calls, and allows them to focus on the task at hand. 
A crucial aspect of inflation targeting is the ability to enhance the credibility of 
the policy-making process and, as a result, to achieve the desired results with minimum 
costs. The timely publication of detailed minutes of MPC meetings is a key ingredient 
for an effective communications strategy. In emerging economies, where credibility is 
typically lower than one would like, the benefits of doing so can be substantial.  
In addition to monthly-meeting minutes, most inflation targeting central banks 
also publish a quarterly Inflation Report where their views on economic prospects and, 
in particular, on inflation trends are presented in detail.
29 Again, for EMEs these reports 
play a key role, serving the purpose of minimizing uncertainty about what the central 
bank is seeing, and what it is trying to achieve. The inflation reports are the appropriate 
vehicle for the central bank to present its views on complex issues such as the degree of 
exchange-rate pass-through, the degree of inflationary persistence, the workings of the 
transmission mechanism, and so on. 
 
5.3. Shocks and “adjusted” targets 
The recent experience of Brazil with inflation targeting during turbulent times 
serves to illustrate the practical application of the general guidelines and principles 
                                                 
29 For an assessment of inflation reports by inflation-targeting central banks, see Fracasso, Genberg, and 
Wyplosz (2003).   37
discussed above. This section summarizes the methodology that is currently being used 
in Brazil. It calculates the inflationary impact of current supply shocks as well as the 
secondary impact of past shocks (due to inertia in the inflation process). The idea is 
simply to accommodate the direct impact of current shocks and to choose a horizon to 
weed out the secondary impact of past shocks.  
When facing shocks, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) initially considers the 
nature and persistence of the shock. Then it builds different inflation and output 
trajectories associated with different interest rate paths. Based on its aversion to 
inflation variability, it chooses the optimal path for output and inflation. Banco Central 
do Brasil (2003) has published this path and also the outcome of different paths. This is 
in line with Svensson's (2002) recommendations.
30 
However, if shocks are large and/or persistent, their inflationary effects may last 
one year or more. The optimal inflation path may imply a 12-month ahead inflation 
superior to the previous annual target. Therefore, in this situation, given that the BCB 
would not be targeting the previous inflation target, it uses an "adjusted target". More 
specifically, the target is adjusted in order to take into account primary effects of change 
in relative prices and of past inertia that will be accommodated. The new target is 
publicly announced. Although there is a credibility loss stemming from the target 
change itself, the gains in terms of transparency and communication are more 
significant. Private agents know the target the BCB is pursuing. Actually, keeping the 
old target would affect the credibility of the BCB because it could be considered 
unattainable.  In the concept of adjusted target, the primary effect of the shock to 
regulated-price inflation, and the inflation inertia inherited from the previous year to be 
accommodated in the current year, are added to the target previously set by the 
                                                 
30 Svensson's (2002) recommendations also involve publishing the corresponding instrument-rate plan.   38
government. Facing cost shocks, such as the increase of regulated prices above the 
inflation of the other prices of the economy, monetary policy should be calibrated so as 
to accommodate the direct impact of shocks on the price level, but to fight their 
secondary effects. Furthermore, since the Central Bank also takes into account output 
costs, the inertial impacts of the previous year’s inflation should not necessarily be 
fought completely.  
Indeed, significant shocks, such as increases in the price of regulated utilities 
and the exchange rate, have been one of the main challenges faced by the BCB. Since 
the implementation of the Real Plan, in July 1994, for a variety of reasons, regulated-
price inflation has been well above the market prices inflation. Considering since the 
start of the inflation targeting period, the ratio of regulated prices to market prices rose 
31.4% (1999:7 - 2003:2). As long as there is some downward rigidity in prices, changes 
in relative prices are usually translated into higher inflation. If these increases are 
treated as a supply shock, monetary policy should be oriented towards eliminating only 
their secondary impact on inflation, while preserving the initial realignment of relative 
prices. Therefore, the efforts of the BCB to quantify the first-order inflationary impact 
of the regulated-price inflation have become particularly important, since it helps to 
implement monetary policy in a flexible manner and without losing sight of the larger 
objective of achieving the inflation targets.  
The first-order inflationary impact of the shock to regulated items is defined as 
the variation in regulated prices exceeding the target for the inflation rate, weighted by 
the share of regulated prices in the IPCA (consumer price index) and excluding the 
effects of the inflation inertia from the previous year and of variations in the exchange 
rate:  
( ) ), ( *
* CaA IA ShA adm adm + − − = ω π π        ( 9 )    39
where  ShA = first-order inflationary impact of regulated  prices; 
π adm = inflation of regulated  prices; 
π
* = target for the inflation; 
ω adm = weight of regulated  prices in the IPCA; 
IA = effect of the inertia in the previous year on the evolution of regulated 
prices; 
CaA  = effect of the exchange rate variation on the evolution of regulated prices. 
 
The effect of the inflation inertia is excluded because inflation propagation 
mechanisms should be neutralized by the monetary policy over a period deemed to be 
appropriate (again, based on the inflation aversion and other parameters). The 
exchange-rate variation is excluded because this variable is affected by monetary policy 
and could reflect demand shocks. If the effect of exchange rate changes were 
automatically included, monetary policy would be validating any inflationary pressure 
coming from exchange rate (including demand pressures). Therefore, in defining the 
shock to regulated prices, only the component of relative price change that is 
predetermined or backward-looking, and therefore cannot be affected by monetary 
policy in the short run, is preserved as a first-order supply shock.  
Table 8 shows how this methodology was applied to the Brazilian case for the 
inflation in 2003 and 2004.
31 The target established by the government for 2003 is 4%. 
However, the regulated-price shocks are estimated in 1.7%. This value represents the 
expected contribution for the overall inflation of a change in relative prices that is not 
related to the inflation inertia from previous year and to the exchange rate change. Since 
                                                 
31 See Banco Central do Brasil (2003). For a more detailed explanation of the methodology, see Freitas, 
Minella, and Riella (2002).   40
these first-round effects should not be neutralized, they are added to the target of the 
Central Bank, leading to an adjusted target of 5.7%. 
 
2003 2004
(a) Target for inflation set by the government 4.0 3.75
(b) Regulated-price shocks
1 1.7 1.1
(c) Inertia not to be fought in the current year
2 2.8 0.6
    Inherited inertia from the previous year (total) 4.2 1.0
                  of regulated prices 1.4 0.4
                  of market prices 2.8 0.6
(d) Adjusted targets (=(a)+(b)+(c)) 8.5 5.5
1) For the calculation of the shock, the effect of inertia and exchange rate on regulated-price inflation is deducted.
2) The inertia not to be fought in the current year corresponds to 2/3 of the inertia inherited from the previous year.
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2003).
Itemization
Table 8
Adjusted targets for 2003 and 2004
 
 
Furthermore, the Central Bank of Brazil also takes into account the nature and 
persistence of the shocks and the output costs involved in the disinflationary process 
(the output weight in the objective function is greater than zero). In this case, the 
Central Bank decided to fight against 1/3 of the inertia inherited from previous year. 
This inertia is estimated in 4.2%. Therefore, we have to add 2.8% to the target, leading 
to an adjusted target of 8.5%, which was publicly announced.  
The decision to pursue an inflation trajectory based upon these adjusted targets 
considers that monetary policy will be able to lead inflation to converge to the target 
tolerance interval in two years. We should stress, however, that two years is no magic 
number. It depends on the size and type of the shock. Figure 9 draws the actual and 
expected path for inflation (Banco Central do Brasil, 2003). The trajectory is compatible 

























































Other trajectories with steeper decreases of inflation imply an excessive loss of 
output. Simulations indicate that a trajectory of inflation that reaches 6.5% in 2003, the 
ceiling of the target tolerance interval, would imply a 1.6% drop in GDP. Moreover, a 
trajectory that reaches the center of the target, 4%, in 2003, would imply an even larger 
decline in GDP (-7.3%). 
One could argue that the decision to neutralize the shock in a longer time 
horizon, based on an evaluation of the size and persistence of the shock, may lead to 
time consistency issues: too much accommodation in the short run leading to a loss of 
credibility in the long run. In fact, it is essential that the whole procedure be explained 
publicly in a very detailed manner, so that the agents could judge effectively whether 
the size and persistence of the shock justify the decision taken by the Central Bank. It is   42
the transparency, therefore, that imposes enough discipline to avoid time-consistency 
issues. 
 In the inflation targeting design, a core inflation measure or the establishment of 
escape clauses have also been used or suggested as a way of dealing with shocks and 
volatilities. The main argument contrary to the use of core inflation is that it is less 
representative of the loss of the purchasing power of money, at a given point in time. 
Agents are concerned about the whole basket of consumption. In the Brazilian case, 
exclusion of the regulated price items would imply to leave out more than 30% of the 
representative consumption basket. In this sense, private agents may question a 
monetary policy that is not concerned about the overall consumer price index. 
In general, there are two advantages in the use of the "adjusted target" 
procedure. First, the core inflation measure is not necessarily isolated from the effect of 
shocks. For example, the large depreciation shock of the Brazilian economy in 2002 led 
to a core inflation–calculated by the symmetric trimmed mean method–of 8.8%, way 
above the inflation target. Second, the construction of the adjusted target is directly 
based on the idea that monetary policy should neutralize second-order effects of supply 
shocks and accommodate the first-round effects, and on the fact that some weight to 
output volatility should be assigned in the objective function. Therefore, the principles 
under which the monetary policy is conducted become more transparent.  
In the case of escape clauses, the circumstances under which the central bank 
can justify the non-fulfillment of the targets are set in advance. It has more similarities 
with the adjusted target procedure than with the use of core as it does not exclude items 
from the inflation target, but defines circumstances in which the breach of targets can be 
justified. The main advantages of the adjusted target procedure are the following: i) it is   43
a forward looking procedure, ii) it defines clearly the new target to be pursued by the 
central bank, and iii) it explains how the new target is measured. 
 
5.4.  IMF programs and conditionality 
  This section focuses on the IMF conditionality in the case of a country under 
inflation targeting regime.
32 We stress two issues: i) the diminished role of net domestic 
assets (NDA) conditionality; ii) how to insert inflation performance as criterion for the 
assessment of monetary policy stance. 
  
5.4.1. NDA conditionality versus inflation targeting 
Brazil was the first country under an inflation targeting system to have an 
agreement with the IMF.  From a theoretical point of view, the NDA conditionality, 
which is usually the one found in the agreements to evaluate the stance of monetary 
policy, is not adequate for an inflation targeting regime because it harms transparency 
and can force the central bank to take unnecessary monetary policy actions. 
  Money demand is unstable, and the monetary aggregates seem to be poor 
predictors of inflation.  Therefore, autonomous increases in the level of money demand 
would require, in the case of NDA ceilings or monetary base targeting, an increase in 
the interest rate without any inflation targeting policy purpose. We would then observe 
higher volatility in the interest rate than needed. Furthermore, the imposition of a NDA 
ceiling can harm transparency in the sense that it would add to the inflation target 
another monetary policy goal. One of the main advantages of an inflation targeting 
regime is the definition of a clear target for monetary policy. The existence of another 
target affects the credibility of the main goal of monetary policy. 
                                                 
32 See also Blejer, Leone, Rabanal, and Schwartz (2001), and Bogdanski, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Tombini 
(2001).   44
 
5.4.2. Inflation performance as criterion for the assessment of monetary policy 
stance 
  In the place of NDA targets, inflation performance emerges as a natural criterion 
for the assessment of monetary policy stance. Of course, since inflation targets focus on 
inflation forecasts, assessing inflation outcomes has to take into account the shocks that 
hit the economy. At least two questions have to be addressed in the case of an IMF 
program: the frequency of the assessments (reviews), and the criteria to base the targets.  
  IMF programs have quarterly reviews, whereas in an inflation targeting 
framework the inflation performance is assessed at longer horizons. The use of 
annualized quarterly inflation figures as targets is not recommended because they are 
more volatile and subject to the strong influence of temporary shocks. Brazil has used a 
12-month inflation as the monetary quarterly target in the Technical Memorandum of 
Understanding with the IMF. It also includes inner and outer bands of 1.0 p.p. and 2.5 
p.p., respectively, both above and below the central targets. Figure 10 shows the targets 
agreed with the IMF in the second review of Brazil's performance in March 2003.  The 
target for the 12-month inflation of the quarter following the agreement considers the 
inflation verified in the three previous quarters plus an estimate for the next quarter 
inflation. However, if an important shock hits the economy in the next quarter, inflation 
may breach the target. 
The path of the targets with the IMF should be consistent with the annual targets 
of the inflation targeting regime. This is in line with the forward-looking or preemptive 
nature of the inflation targeting system. At the same time, it eliminates the problem of 
the effect of quarterly figures because the time horizon for the inflation target could be 
defined as four quarters. Eventual (predicted) pick-ups of inflation during the year   45
should not alter the monetary policy committee decisions, provided inflation is expected 
to converge to the target; and shocks in one year keep affecting inflation in the 
following year, but only through the direct channel, that is, via the autoregressive 
component of inflation. 
 
Figure 10
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The main difficult arises with the necessity of agreement between the IMF and 
the central bank concerning the model used and the associated risks, which also may be 
time consuming. Therefore, it also involves the construction of credibility by the 
forecast-making process of the central bank. 
In the agreements of Brazil with the IMF, the inflation forecasts made by the 
Central Bank have been used as an important criterion for the definition of the targets. 
However, the revisions are still made on a quarterly basis based on the actual inflation. 
The reasons for the non-fulfillment of targets have been explained thoroughly to the 
public and to the IMF. 
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6. Conclusions 
Inflation targeting in EMEs has been relatively successful but has proven to be a 
challenging task. The volatility of output, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate has 
been higher than in developed countries. Several issues have led these economies to 
face this less favorable trade-off. The process of building credibility, the necessity of 
reducing inflation levels, the dominance issues, and the larger shocks have played an 
important role. 
To deal with this more volatile environment, we recommend i) high levels of 
communication and transparency; ii) target bands treated mainly as communication 
devices; iii) a methodology to calculate the convergence path following a shock 
(adjusted targets); and iv) better IMF conditionality under inflation targeting. 
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